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Abstract: The Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma with Intragroup Power Dynamics (IPD^2) is
a new game paradigm for studying human behavior in conflict situations. IPD^2 adds the
concept of intragroup power to an intergroup version of the standard Repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. We conducted a laboratory study in which individual human participants
played the game against computer strategies of various complexities. The results show that
participants tend to cooperate more when they have greater power status within their
groups. IPD^2 yields increasing levels of mutual cooperation and decreasing levels of
mutual defection, in contrast to a variant of Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma without
intragroup power dynamics where mutual cooperation and mutual defection are equally
likely. We developed a cognitive model of human decision making in this game inspired
by the Instance-Based Learning Theory (IBLT) and implemented within the ACT-R
cognitive architecture. This model was run in place of a human participant using the same
paradigm as the human study. The results from the model show a pattern of behavior
similar to that of human data. We conclude with a discussion of the ways in which the
IPD^2 paradigm can be applied to studying human behavior in conflict situations. In
particular, we present the current study as a possible contribution to corroborating the
conjecture that democracy reduces the risk of wars.
Keywords: repeated prisoner’s dilemma; intergroup prisoner’s dilemma; intragroup power;
cognitive modeling
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1. Introduction
Erev and Roth have argued for the necessity of a Cognitive Game Theory that focuses on players’
thought processes and develops simple general models that can be appropriately adapted to specific
circumstances, as opposed to building or estimating specific models for each game of interest [1]. In
line with this approach, Lebiere, Wallach, and West [2] developed a cognitive model of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) that generalized to other games from Rapoport et al.’s taxonomy of 2 × 2 games [3].
This model leverages basic cognitive abilities such as memory by making decisions based on records
of previous rounds stored in long-term memory. A memory record includes only directly experienced
information such as one’s own move, the other player’s move, and the payoff. The decision is
accomplished by a set of rules that, given each possible action, retrieves the most likely outcome from
memory and selects the move with the highest payoff. The model predictions originate from and are
strongly constrained by learning mechanisms occurring at the sub-symbolic level of the ACT-R
cognitive architecture [4]. The current work builds upon and extends this model. We use abstract
representations of conflict as is common in the field of Game Theory [5], but we are interested in the
actual (rather than normative) aspects of human behavior that explain how people make strategic
decisions given their experiences and cognitive constraints [6].
In understanding human behavior in real world situations, it is also necessary to capture the
complexities of their interactions. The dynamics of many intergroup conflicts can be usefully
represented by a two-level game [7]. At the intragroup level, various factions (parties) pursue their
interests by trying to influence the policies of the group. At the intergroup level, group leaders seek to
maximize their gain as compared to other groups while also satisfying their constituents. For example,
domestic and international politics are usually entangled: international pressure leads to domestic
policy shifts and domestic politics impact the success of international negotiations [7]. A basic
two-level conflict game extensively studied is the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma [8,9]. In this game,
two levels of conflict (intragroup and intergroup) are considered simultaneously. The intragroup level
consists of an n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game while the intergroup level is a regular PD
game. A variant of this game, the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma—Maximizing Difference, was
designed to study what motivates individual self-sacrificial behavior in intergroup conflicts [10]. This
game disentangles altruistic motivations to benefit the in-group and aggressive motivations to hurt the
out-group. As is often the case in these games, within-group communication dramatically influences
players’ decisions. This result suggests that intragroup interactions (such as communication,
negotiation, or voting) might generally have a strong influence on individuals’ decisions in conflict
situations. In our view, games that incorporate abstracted forms of intragroup interactions more
accurately represent real-world conflict situations. An open question that will be addressed here is
whether groups with dynamic and flexible internal structures (e.g., democracies) are less likely to
engage in conflicts (e.g., wars) than groups with static and inflexible internal structures
(e.g., dictatorships).
A characteristic of social interactions that many two-level games currently do not represent is
power. Although numerous definitions of power are in use both colloquially and in research literature,
Emerson [11] was one of the first to highlight its relationship-specificity: “power resides implicitly in
the other’s dependency.” In this sense, a necessary and sufficient condition for power is the ability of
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one actor to exercise influence over another [11]. However, power can also affect relationships
between groups, such that group members are confronted simultaneously with the goal of obtaining
and maintaining power within the group, and with the goal of identifying with a group that is more
powerful compared to other groups. Often, these two objectives pull individuals in opposite directions,
leading unpredictably to allegiance with or defection from group norms. Researchers have focused on
the contrast between groups of low power and those of high power in the extent to which they will
attempt to retain or alter the status quo. Social dominance theories propose that in-group attachment
will be more strongly associated with hierarchy-enhancing ideologies for members of powerful
groups [12], especially when there is a perceived threat to their high status [13,14]. At the same time,
system justification theory describes how members of less powerful groups might internalize their
inferiority and thus legitimize power asymmetries [15], but this effect is moderated by the perceived
injustice of low status [16]. Within dyads, the contrast between one’s own power and the power of
one’s partner is especially salient in inducing emotion [17], suggesting that individual power is sought
concurrently to group power.
Here we introduce intragroup power to an Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma game as a determinant of
each actor’s ability to maximize long-term payoffs through between-group cooperation or competition.
This game, the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma with Intragroup Power Dynamics (IPD^2), intends to
reproduce the two-level interactions in which players are simultaneously engaged in an intragroup
power struggle and an intergroup conflict. We introduce a power variable that represents both outcome
power and social power. Outcome power (power to) is the ability of an actor to bring about outcomes,
while social power (power over) is the ability of an actor to influence other actors [18]. The outcomes
are reflected in payoff for the group. Oftentimes in the real world, power does not equate with payoff.
Free riders get payoff without having power. Correspondingly, power does not guarantee profitable
decision-making. However, a certain level of power can be a prerequisite for achieving significant
amounts of payoff, and in return, payoff can cause power consolidation or shift. A leader who brings
positive outcomes for the group can consolidate her position of power, whereas negative outcomes
might shift power away from the responsible leader. We introduced these kinds of dynamics of payoff
and power in the IPD^2.
As a consequence of the complex interplay between power and payoff, IPD^2 departs from the
classical behavioral game theory paradigm in which a payoff matrix is either explicitly presented to the
participants or easily learned through the experience of game playing. The introduction of the
additional dimension of power and the interdependencies of a 2-group (4-player) game increases the
complexity of interactions such that players might not be able to figure out the full range of game
outcomes with limited experience. Instead of trying to find the optimal solution (compute equilibria),
they might aim at satisficing as people do in many real-world situations [19].
This paper reports empirical and computational modeling work that is part of a larger effort to
describe social and cognitive factors that influence conflict motivations and conflict resolution. Our
main contribution is three-fold: (1) We present a new game paradigm, IPD^2, that can be used to
represent complex decision making situations in which intragroup power dynamics interact with
intergroup competition or cooperation; (2) We put forth a computational cognitive model that aims to
explain and predict how humans make decisions and learn in this game; and (3) We describe a
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laboratory study aimed at exploring the range of behaviors that individual human participants exhibit
when they play the game against computer strategies of various complexities.
The following sections will describe the IPD^2 game, the cognitive model, and the laboratory
study, and end with discussions, conclusions, and plans for further research.
2. Description of the IPD^2 Game
IPD^2 is an extension of the well-known Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma paradigm [20]. This is a
paradigm in Game Theory that demonstrates why two people might not cooperate even when
cooperating would increase their long-run payoffs. In the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, two players,
“Player1” and “Player2,” each decide between two actions that can be referred to as “cooperate” (C)
and “defect” (D). The players choose their actions simultaneously and repeatedly. The two players
receive their payoffs after each round, which are calculated according to a payoff matrix setting up a
conflict between short-term and long-term payoffs (see example of the payoff matrix used in Table 1).
If both players cooperate, they each get one point. If both defect, they each lose one point. If one
defects while the other cooperates, the player who defects gets four points and the player who
cooperates loses four points. Note that the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma is a non-zero-sum game: one
player’s gain does not necessarily equal the other player’s loss. While long-run payoffs are maximized
when both players choose to cooperate, that is often not the resulting behavior. In a single round of the
game, rational choice would lead each player to play D in an attempt to maximize his/her immediate
payoff, resulting in a loss for both players. This can be seen as a conflict between short-term and
long-term considerations. In the short-term (i.e., the current move), a player will maximize personal
payoff by defecting regardless of the opponent’s choice. In the long-term, however, that logic will lead
to sustained defection, which is worse than mutual cooperation for both players. The challenge is
therefore for players to establish trust in one another through cooperation, despite the threat of
unilateral defection (and its lopsided payoffs) at any moment.
Table 1. Payoff matrix used in Prisoner’s Dilemma. Each cell shows values X/Y with X
being the payoff to Player 1 and Y the payoff to Player 2 for the corresponding row and
column actions.

Player1

C
D

C
1 ,1
4 ,–4

Player2
D
–4 ,4
–1 ,–1

In IPD^2, two groups play a Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Each group is composed of two
players. Within a group, each player chooses individually whether to cooperate or defect, but only the
choice of the player with the greatest power within the group counts as the group's choice. This is
equivalent to saying that the two players simultaneously vote for the choice of the group and the vote
of the player with more power bears a heavier weight. By analogy with the political arena, one player
is the majority and the other is the minority. The majority imposes its decisions over the minority. In
what follows, the player with the higher value of power in a group will be referred to as the majority
and the player with the lower power in a group will be referred to as the minority.
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A player’s power is a quantity assigned at the start of the game and increased or decreased after
each round of the game depending on the outcome of the interaction. The sum of power within a group
remains constant throughout the game. Thus, the intragroup power game is a zero-sum game
embedded in an intergroup non-zero-sum game. All players start the game with the same amount of
power. A random value is added or subtracted from each player’s power level at each round. This
random noise serves the functions of breaking ties (only one player can be in power at any given time)
and of adding a degree of uncertainty to the IPD^2 game. Arguably, uncertainty makes the game more
ecologically valid, as uncertainty is a characteristic of many natural environments [21].
If the two members of a group made the same decision (both played C or both played D), their
powers do not change after the round other than for random variation. If they made different decisions,
their powers change in a way that depends on the outcome of the inter-group game, as follows:
For the player in majority i,
Power(i)t = Power(i)t – 1 + Group-payofft/s
For the player in minority j,
Power(j)t = Power(j)t – 1 – Group-payofft/s
where Powert is the current power at round t, Powert-1 is the power from the previous round,
Group-payofft is the current group payoff in round t from the inter-group Prisoner’s Dilemma game,
and s is a scaling factor (set to 100 in this study). The indices i and j refer to the majority and minority
players, respectively.
Note that the values in the payoff matrix can be positive or negative (Table 1). Thus, if the group
receives a positive payoff, the power of the majority player increases whereas the power of the
minority player decreases. If the group receives a negative payoff, the power of the majority player
decreases whereas the power of the minority player increases. The total power of a group is a constant
equal to 1.0 in the IPD^2 game.
The total payoff to the group in each round is shared between the two group mates in direct
proportion to their relative power levels as follows:
Payofft = Payofft – 1 + Powert × Group-payofft/s
where Payofft is the cumulative individual payoff after round t and Payofft – 1 is the cumulative
individual payoff from the previous round t – 1 and Group-payofft is that obtained from the inter-group
Prisoner’s Dilemma game matrix. Again, since the group’s payoff can be positive or negative, an
individual player’s payoff can be incremented or decremented by a quantity proportional to the
player’s power. For example, if the group gets a negative payoff, the individual payoff of the majority
player is decremented by a larger amount than the individual payoff of the minority player.
Power and payoff for individual players are expressed as cumulative values because we are
interested in their dynamics (i.e., how they increase and decrease throughout the game). On a given
round, individual power and payoff increases or decreases depending on the group payoff, the power
status, and whether or not there is implicit consensus of choice between the two players on a group.
The key feature is that in the absence of consensus, positive group payoffs will result in an increase in
power for the majority while negative group payoffs will result in a decrease of power for the majority.
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The players make simultaneous decisions and they receive feedback after each round. The feedback
is presented in a tabular format as shown in Table 2. In this example, the human participant was
randomly assigned to Group-2. The three computer strategies were given non-informative labels. The
choice of the majority player (i.e., the choice that counts as the group choice) was colored in magenta (and
shown in bold font and gray background in Figure 2). The cumulative payoff (payoff total) was shown in
red when negative and in blue when positive (shown herein italics and underlined, respectively).
Table 2. Example of feedback presented to the human participants after each round in the
IPD^2 game.
Group

Player

Choice

Power

P1-1

B

0.525

Group-1

Group-2

Group payoff

Player payoff

Payoff total

0.005

–0.003

0.005

–0.007

0.003

0.087

0.007

0.143

1
P1-2

B

0.475

P2-1

A

0.265

Human

B

0.735

1

The participants choose between A and B. The labels A and B are randomly assigned to Cooperate
and Defect for each participant at the beginning of the experimental session. In the example shown in
Table 2, A was assigned to Defect and B to Cooperate. The labels keep their meaning throughout the
session, across rounds and games. It is presumed that participants will discover the meaning of the two
options from the experience of playing and the feedback provided in the table, given that the payoff
matrix is not given explicitly.
3. A Cognitive Model of IPD^2
We developed a cognitive model of human behavior in IPD^2 to understand and explain the
dynamics of power in two-level interactions. This model was inspired by the cognitive processes and
representations proposed in the Instance-Based Learning Theory (IBLT) [22]. IBLT proposes a generic
decision-making process that starts by recognizing and generating experiences through interaction with
a changing environment, and closes with the reinforcement of experiences that led to good decision
outcomes through feedback from the environment. The decision-making process is explained in detail
by Gonzalez et al. [22] and it involves the following steps: The recognition of a situation from an
environment (a task) and the creation of decision alternatives; the retrieval of similar experiences from
the past to make decisions, or the use of decision heuristics in the absence of similar experiences; the
selection of the best alternative; and the process of reinforcing good experiences through feedback.
IBLT also proposes a key form of cognitive information representation, an instance. An instance
consists of three parts: a situation in a task (a set of attributes that define the decision context), a
decision or action in a task, and an outcome or utility of the decision in a situation in the task. The
different parts of an instance are built through a general decision process: creating a situation from
attributes in the task, a decision and expected utility when making a judgment, and updating the utility
in the feedback stage. In this model, however, the utility will be reflected implicitly rather than
explicitly. The instances accumulated over time in memory are retrieved from memory and are used
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repeatedly. Their strength in memory, called “activation,” is reinforced according to statistical
procedures reflecting their use and in turn determines their accessibility. These statistical procedures
were originally developed by Anderson and Lebiere [4] as part of the ACT-R cognitive architecture.
This is the cognitive architecture we used to build the current model for IPD^2.
3.1. The ACT-R Theory and Architecture of Cognition
ACT-R 1 is a theory of human cognition and a cognitive architecture that is used to develop
computational models of various cognitive tasks. ACT-R is composed of various modules. There are
two memory modules that are of interest here: declarative memory and procedural memory.
Declarative memory stores facts (know-what), and procedural memory stores rules about how to do
things (know-how). The rules from procedural memory serve the purpose of coordinating the
operations of the asynchronous modules. ACT-R is a hybrid cognitive architecture including both
symbolic and sub-symbolic components. The symbolic structures are memory elements (chunks) and
procedural rules. A set of sub-symbolic equations controls the operation of the symbolic structures. For
instance, if several rules are applicable to a situation, a sub-symbolic utility equation estimates the
relative cost and benefit associated with each rule and selects for execution the rule with the highest
utility. Similarly, whether (or how fast) a fact can be retrieved from declarative memory depends upon
sub-symbolic retrieval equations, which take into account the context and the history of usage of that
fact. The learning processes in ACT-R control both the acquisition of symbolic structures and the
adaptation of their sub-symbolic quantities to the statistics of the environment.
The base-level activation of memory elements (chunks) in ACT-R is governed by the
following equation:
n

Bi = ln(∑ t −j d ) + β i
j =1

Bi: The base level activation for chunk i
n: The number of presentations for chunk i. A presentation can be the chunk’s initial entry into
memory, its retrieval, or its re-creation (the chunk’s presentations are also called the
chunk’s references).
tj: The time since the jth presentation.
d: The decay parameter
βi: A constant offset

In short, the activation of a memory element is a function of its frequency (how often it was used),
recency (how recently it was used), and noise.
ACT-R has been used to develop cognitive models for tasks that vary from simple reaction time
experiments to driving a car, learning algebra, and playing strategic games (e.g., [2]). The ACT-R
modeling environment offers many validated tools and mechanisms to model a rather complex game
such as IPD^2. Modeling IPD^2 in ACT-R can also be a challenge and thus an opportunity for further
development of the architecture.
1

Adaptive Control of Thought—Rational.
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3.2. The Model
Figure 1. A diagram of the procedural elements of the cognitive model.
Situation (state of the game)

Rule 1
Retrieve situation-decision pair

N

Retrieved?

Rule 3
Repeat previous decision

Y
Rule 2
Choose retrieved decision

Feedback
Payoff (+/-)

Y

Positive
payoff?

N
Rule 4
Create situation-alternative_decision pair

Table 2. Example of an instance: the Situation part holds choices from the previous round
for the own group and the opposing group; the Decision part holds the choice for the
current round.
Own
group
Situation
Other
group
Decision

Choice own
Choice mate
Choice own group
Choice member1 of other group
Choice member2 of other group
Choice other group
Next choice own

For each round of the game, the model checks whether it has previously encountered the same
situation (attributes in the situation section of an instance), and if so, what action (decision) it took in
that situation (see Figure 1, Rule 1). The situation is characterized by the choices of all the players and
the group choices in the previous round. For example, let us assume that the current state of the game
is the one represented in Table 2, where the human player is substituted by the model. We see that in
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the previous round the model played B, its group mate played A, and the two players on the opposite
group played B (where A and B were randomly assigned to cooperate and defect, respectively). The
group choice was B for both groups (because the model was in power). This information constitutes
the situation components of the instance in which the model will make a decision for the next round.
These attributes will act as the retrieval cues: the model will attempt to remember whether an identical
situation has been previously encountered. The model’s memory stores as an instance each situation
that is encountered at each round of the game and the associated decision taken by the model in
that situation.
Table 2 shows an example of an instance stored in the model’s memory. Note that the situation part
matches our presumed state of the game. The decision part of an instance specifies the action taken in
that context. If such a memory element is retrieved, its decision part is used as the current decision of
the model (see Figure 1, Rule 2). Thus, in the case of a repeated situation, the model decides to take
the decision that is “recommended” by its memory. In our example, the model decides to play B.
The process might fail to retrieve an instance that matches2 the current situation either because the
current situation has not been encountered before, or because the instance has been forgotten. In this
case, the model repeats its previous decision (see Figure 1, Rule 3). This rule was supported by the
observation of high inertia in the human data of this and other games (e.g., [21]). For the first round in
the game, the model randomly chooses an action. For a given situation, the model can have up to two
matching instances, one with A and the other one with B as the decision. If two instances match the
current situation, the model will only retrieve the most active one. This model only uses the base-level
activation and the activation noise from the ACT-R architecture (see Section 3.1).
Once a decision is made, the model receives positive or negative payoff. The real value of the
payoff is not saved in memory as in other IBLT models. Instead, the valence of payoff (positive or
negative) determines the course of action that is undertaken by the model 3 . When the payoff is
positive, the activation of the memory element that was used to make the decision increases
(a reference is added after its retrieval). This makes it more likely that the same instance will be
retrieved when the same situation reoccurs. When the payoff is negative, activation of the retrieved
instance increases, and the model additionally creates a new instance by saving the current situation
together with the alternative decision. The new instance may be entirely new, or it may reinforce an
instance that existed in memory but was not retrieved. Thus, after receiving negative payoff, the model
has two instances with the same situation and opposite decisions in its memory. When the same
situation occurs again, the model will have two decision alternatives to choose from. In time, the more
lucrative decision will be activated and the less lucrative decision will decay. As mentioned above
(section 3.2), retrieving and creating instances makes them more active and more available for retrieval
when needed. A decay process causes the existing instances to be forgotten if they are not frequently
and recently used. Thus, although instances are neutral with regard to payoff, the procedural process of
retrieving and creating instances is guided by the perceived feedback (payoff); negative feedback
2

Matching here refers to ACT-R’s perfect matching. A model employing partial matching was not satisfactory

in terms of performance and fit to the human data.
3

Storing the real value of payoff in an instance would make the model sensitive to payoff magnitude and

improve the performance of the model. However, this decreases the model’s fit to the human data.
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causes the model to “consider” the alternative action, whereas positive feedback causes the model to
persist in choosing the lucrative instance.
Figure 2 shows a possible situation in the game. In round 7, the model encounters situation s2,
which was encountered before at rounds 2 and 5. Situation s2 is used as a retrieval cue. There are two
actions associated with situation s2 in memory. Action a2 was chosen in round 2, which resulted in the
creation of the s2a2 instance. Action a1 was recently followed by negative feedback at round 5, which
caused s2a1 to be created and s2a2 to accumulate additional activation as the alternative of a failed
action (see also Figure 1, Rule 4). Due to their history of use, the two instances end up with different
cumulative activations: instance s2a2 is more active than instance s2a1. Notice that there is only one
instance in memory containing situation s3 (s3a2). Whenever the model encounters situation s3, it will
chose action a2, and it will continue to do so as long as the payoff remains positive. Only when action
a2 causes negative payoff in situation s3, the alternative instance (s3a1) will be created.
Figure 2. Example of how a decision is based on the retrieval of the most active instance in
memory. The most active instance is underlined.

This model meets our criteria for simplicity, in that it makes minimal assumptions and leaves the
parameters of the ACT-R architecture at their defaults (see Section 5.4 for a discussion regarding
parameter variation). The situation in an instance includes only the choices of all players and the
resulting group choices in the previous round, all directly available information. This is the minimum
amount of information that is necessary to usefully represent the behavior of individual players and the
power standings in each group. However, one can imagine a more complex model that would store
more information as part of the situation. For example, the real values of power and payoff can be
stored in memory. This could help to model situations where players might behave differently when
they have a strong power advantage than when they have a weak one. Another elaboration would be to
store not only the decisions from the previous round, but also from several previous rounds
(see, e.g., [23]). This would help the model learn more complex strategies, such as an alternation
sequence of C and D actions. These elaborations will be considered for the next versions of the model.
4. Laboratory Study

A laboratory study was conducted to investigate the range of human decision making behaviors and
outcomes in IPD^2 and to be able to understand how closely the predictions from the model described
above corresponded to human behavior.
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In this study, one human participant interacted with three computer strategies in a game: one as
group mate and two as opponents. The reason for this design choice was twofold: (1) the game is new
and there is no reference to what human behavior in this game looks like, so it makes sense to start
with the most tractable condition that minimizes the complexities of human-human interactions; (2) the
input to the cognitive model described in the previous section can be precisely controlled so as to
perfectly match the input to the human participants.
Within this setup, we were particularly interested in the impact of intragroup power on intergroup
cooperation and competition at both the individual level and the game level. The individual level refers
to one player’s decisions, and the game level refers to all players’ decisions. For example, the amount
of cooperation can be relatively high for one player but relatively low for the game in which the player
participates. The following research questions guided our investigation: (1) Given the added
complexity, are the human participants able to learn the game and play it successfully in terms of
accumulated power and payoff? (2) What is the proportion of cooperative actions taken by human
participants and how does it change throughout the game? (3) Does the proportion of cooperation
differ depending on the participant’s power status? (4) What are the relative proportions of the
symmetric outcomes (CC and DD) and asymmetric outcomes (CD and DC), and how do they change
throughout the game? Specifically, we expect that the intragroup power dynamics will increase the
proportion of mutual cooperation and decrease the proportion of mutual defection. (5) How do the
human participants and the cognitive model interact with computer strategies?
A far-reaching goal was to explore the contribution of the IPD^2 paradigm in understanding human
motivations and behaviors in conflict situations.
4.1. Participants
Sixty-eight participants were recruited from the Carnegie Mellon University community with the
aid of a web ad. They were undergraduate (51) and graduate students (16 Master’s and 1 Ph.D.
student). Their field of study had a wide range (see Annex 1 for a table with the number of participants
from each field). The average age was 24 and 19 were females. They received monetary compensation
unrelated to their performance in the IPD^2 game. Although it is common practice in behavioral game
theory experiments to pay participants for their performance, we decided to not pay for performance in
this game for the following reasons:
- Since this is the first major empirical study with IPD^2, we intended to start with a minimal level of
motivation for the task: participants were instructed to try to increase their payoff. This was
intended as a baseline for future studies that can add more complex incentive schemes.
- Traditional economic theory assumes that money can be used as a common currency for utility.
IPD^2 challenges this assumption by introducing power (in addition to payoff) as another indicator
of utility. By not paying for performance, we allowed motives that are not directly related to
financial gain to be expressed.
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4.2. Design
Five computer strategies of various complexities were developed. The intention was to have
participants interact with a broad set of strategies representing the diverse spectrum of approaches that
other humans might plausibly take in the game, yet preserve enough control over those strategies. As
mentioned above, this is only the first step in our investigation of the IPD^2 game, and we
acknowledge the need to follow up with a study of human-human interactions in IPD^2. The following
are descriptions of the strategies that were used in this study:
Always-cooperate and Always-defect are maximally simple and predictable strategies, always
selecting the C and D options, respectively. They are also extreme strategies and thus they broaden the
range of actions to which the participants are exposed. For example, one would expect a player to
adjust its level of cooperation or defection based on the way the other players in the game play.
However, these two strategies are extremely cooperative and extremely non-cooperative, respectively.
Tit-for-tat repeats the last choice of the opposing group. This is a very effective strategy validated in
several competitions and used in many laboratory studies in which human participants interact with
computer strategies (e.g., [24]). Its first choice is D, unlike the standard Tit-for-tat that starts with
C [25]. Starting with D eliminates the possibility that an increase in cooperation with repeated play
would be caused by the initial bias toward cooperation of the standard Tit-for-tat.
Seek-power plays differently depending on its power status. When in the majority, it plays like
Tit-for-tat. When in the minority, it plays C or D depending on the outcome of the intergroup
Prisoner’s Dilemma game in the previous round. The logic of this choice assumes that the minority
player tries to gain power by sharing credit for positive outcomes and by avoiding blame for negative
ones. In addition, this strategy makes assumptions with regard to the other players' most likely moves;
it assumes that the majority players will repeat their moves from the previous round. If the previous
outcome was symmetric (CC or DD), Seek-power plays C. Under the assumption of stability
(i.e., previous move is repeated), C is the choice that is guaranteed to not decrease power (see
description of how power is updated in section 2). If the previous outcome was asymmetric
(CD or DC), Seek-power plays D. In this case, D is the move that is guaranteed to not lose power.
Seek-power was designed as a “best response” strategy for a player that knows the rules of the game
and assumes maximally predictable opponents. It was expected to play reasonably well and bring in
sufficient challenge for the human players in terms of its predictability.
Exploit plays “Win-stay, lose-shift” when in the majority and plays Seek-power when in the
minority. (“Win” and “lose” refer to positive and negative payoffs, respectively.) “Win-stay,
lose-shift” (also known as Pavlov) is another very effective strategy that is frequently used against
humans and other computer strategies in experiments. It has two important advantages over tit-for-tat:
it recovers from occasional mistakes and it exploits unconditional cooperators [26]. By combining
Pavlov in the majority with Seek-power in the minority, Exploit was intended to be a simple yet
effective strategy for playing IPD^2.
Each human participant was matched with each computer strategy twice as group mates, along with
different pairs of the other four strategies on the opposing group. Selection was balanced to ensure that
each strategy appeared equally as often as partner or opponent. As a result, ten game types were
constructed (Table 3). For example, the human participant is paired with Seek-power twice as group
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mates. One time, their opposing group is composed of Exploit and Always-cooperate (Game type 1),
and the other time their opposing group is composed of Always-defect and Tit-for-tat (Game type 8).
A Latin square design was used to counterbalance the order of game types. Thus, all participants
played 10 games, with each participant being assigned to one of ten ordering conditions as determined
by the Latin square design. Each game was played for 50 rounds, thus each participant played a total of
500 rounds.
Table 3.The ten game types that resulted from matching the human participant with
computer strategies. The numbers do not reflect any ordering.
Game type
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Group-1

Group-2

Seek-Power HUMAN
Exploit Always-Cooperate
Tit-For-Tat Always-Cooperate
Exploit HUMAN
Always-Cooperate HUMAN
Seek-Power Tit-For-Tat
Exploit Always-Defect
HUMAN Always-Cooperate
Always-Cooperate Seek-Power
Always-Defect HUMAN
HUMAN Tit-For-Tat
Always-Cooperate Always-Defect
HUMAN Exploit
Always-Defect Seek-Power
Always-Defect Tit-For-Tat
HUMAN Seek-Power
HUMAN Always-Defect
Tit-For-Tat Exploit
Seek-Power Exploit
Tit-For-Tat HUMAN

4.3. Materials
The study was run in the Dynamic Decision Making Laboratory at Carnegie Mellon University. The
task software4 was developed in-house using Allegro Common LISP and the last version of the ACT-R
architecture [27]. The task software was used for both running human participants and the ACT-R
model. ACT-R, however, is not necessarily needed for the implementation of the IPD^2 game
involving human participants.
4.4. Procedure
Each participant gave signed and informed consent, and received detailed instructions on the
structure of the IPD^2 game. The instructions explained the two groups, how the groups were
composed of two players, what choices players have, how power and payoff are updated, and how
many games would be played. No information was conveyed regarding the identity of the other players
and no information was given regarding the strategies the other players used. Participants were asked
to try to maximize their payoffs. After receiving the instructions, each human participant played a
practice game followed by the ten game types. The practice game had Always-Defect as the group
mate for the human and Always-Cooperate and Tit-For-Tat as the opposing group. The participants
were not told the number of rounds per game in order to create a situation that approximates the
theoretical infinitely repeated games in which participants cannot apply any backward reasoning.

4

The task software will be made available for download.
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5. Human and Model Results

We present the results at two levels: the player level and the game level. At the player level, we
analyze the main variables that characterize the average player’s behavior: payoff, power, and choice.
At the game level, we analyze reciprocity, equilibria, and repetition propensities. In addition, we will
discuss the variability of results across game types and participants.
We compare the human data to the data from model simulations. The model was run in the role of
the human against the same set of opponents following the same design as in the laboratory study (see
Table 3). The model was used to simulate 80 participants in order to obtain estimates within the same
range of accuracy as in the human data (68 participants). Each simulated participant was run through
the same set of ten games of 50 rounds each in the order determined by the Latin square design.
5.1. Player Level Analyses
The human participants were able to learn the game and perform adaptively: on average they
managed to achieve positive payoff by the end of the game (Figure 3A). Note that the learning curve is
different than the typical learning curve where a steep increase in performance is followed by a
plateau [1]. The learning curve found here starts with a decline and ends with a steep increase in the
second half of the game. The learning curve of the model is a similar shape. At the beginning of the
game, the model and presumably the human participants do not have enough instances in memory to
identify and carry out a profitable course of action and thus engage in exploratory behavior. Similar
behavior was observed in models of Paper-Rock-Scissors [23,28]. As the game progresses, more
instances are accumulated, the effective ones become more active, and the ineffective ones are
gradually forgotten. In addition, individual payoff depends on the synchronization of multiple players
(achieving stable outcomes) in this task, which takes time. For instance, the stability of the mutual
cooperation outcome depends on the two groups having cooperative leaders at the same time. In other
words, the shape of the learning curve cannot be solely attributed to a slow-learning human or model,
because individual performance depends also on the development of mutual cooperation at the
intergroup level (see Annex 2 for model simulations with more than 50 trials).
Both human participants and the model exhibit a relatively linear increase of their power over the
course of the game (Figure 3B). Participants were not explicitly told to increase their power. They
were only told that being in power was needed to make their choice matter for their group. Similarly,
the ACT-R model does not try to optimize power. The power status is only indirectly represented in an
instance when the two players in a group make different decisions. In this case, the group choice
indicates who is the majority player. With time, the model learns how to play so as to maximize payoff
in both positions (minority and majority). Thus, the increase in power throughout the game that was
observed in our study and simulation can be explained based on the impact that payoff has on power:
good decisions lead to positive payoffs that lead to positive increments in power. This is not to say that
power and payoff are confounded. Their correlation is significantly positive (r = 0.36, p < 0.05),
reflecting the interdependence between power and payoff. However, the magnitude of this correlation
is obviously not very high, reflecting the cases in which being in majority does not necessarily lead to
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gains in payyoff (e.g., when faced with defectting partnerrs) and alsoo certain accumulation
n of payoff is
possible wheen the playeer is in minoority (e.g., when faced with coopeerating partnners).
und the
Figuree 3.Time course of paayoff (A) and power (B). The dootted-line innterval arou
humann data represents standaard error off the mean.
A

B

operation) broken dow
wn by powerr status
Figuree 4.Time coourse of chooice (propoortion of coo
(A-maajority and B-minorityy) for humaans and mod
del. The dootted-line innterval arou
und the
humann data represents standaard error off the mean.
A

B

The hum
man particippants chosee to cooperate more often than to defect: of all actio
ons, 55% arre
cooperation and 45% are defectionn. In addition, the hum
man particippants tend to cooperatee more wheen
thhey are in majority (660%) than in minority (49%). Thee proportionn of cooperration increeased as theey
progress throough the gaame, particuularly in maajority (Figu
ure 4A). Thhe model shhows the sam
me pattern of
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inncreasing cooperationn when in majority, except that the amounnt of coopeeration is much greateer
(Figure 4A). In minoritty (Figure 4B), both the human an
nd the modeel show low
wer levels off cooperatioon
thhan in majjority. In addition, thhe model shows increeasing coopperation ass it progressses througgh
thhe game.
Why doees the modeel cooperatee more wheen in majorrity than whhen in minoority? We looked at thhe
model simulation data and counteed the numbber of timess the modell received positive verrsus negativve
f
feedback
(paayoff). As we explaineed in Sectionn 3, when th
he model reeceives posittive payoff,, it reinforcees
thhe action thhat caused the positivve payoff. When it recceives negaative payofff, it reinforrces both thhe
action that caused the negative payyoff and its opposite acction. For example, if the model cooperates in
a particular situation and receivees a negativve payoff, it reinforcees both coooperation an
nd defectionn.
When the model encouunters the same situation later, eitther action is likely too be retrieveed. Thus, thhe
model has a chance to choose thee action thatt will lead to positive payoff. If this chance materializees
and the moodel does receive posiitive payofff, only thee choice that caused positive paayoff will be
r
reinforced.
In time, thee choice thaat leads to negative pay
yoff in a givven situatioon tends to be forgottenn.
Figure 5A shhows that thhe model reeceives posiitive feedbaack (payoff)) more frequuently when
n in majoritty
and negativee feedback more frequuently whenn in minoriity. As a coonsequencee, when in majority, thhe
model will tend to reinfforce a partiicular actionn (in this caase cooperattion), whereeas when in
n minority thhe
model will tend to creaate and reinnforce alterrnatives for each action in a giveen situation.. The humaan
participants (Figure 5B) also receive positive feedback more frequently when in majority and negativve
f
feedback
moore frequenttly when in minority. When in maajority, theyy would be able to engaage in mutuaal
cooperation “agreemennts” with thhe oppositee group that generatee positive payoffs. Th
hese positivve
payoffs willl encouragee them to continue coooperating. When in minority, theey would no
ot be able to
enact inter-ggroup mutuaal cooperatiion and will try out both options (cooperationn and defecction). Noticce
thhat the corrrespondencee between model and humans is not perfect. Humans recceive negattive feedbacck
t model, and the mod
del receivess positive feeedback more frequentlly
inn minority more frequeently than the
when in majjority than the humans..
Figuree 5. The prooportion of negative annd positive feedback reeceived by the model (A) and
humann participannts (B) in thee two powerr conditionss.
A

B

Feed
dback by po
ower status (MODEL)

Feedbacck by powerr status (HU
UMAN)
0.4

0.3
0.2

Negaative

0.1

Posittive

0

Frequencies

Frequencies

0.4

0.3
0.2

Negative

0.1

Positive

0
Minority

Majority

Minority

Majority
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5.2. Game Level Analyses
The amount of mutual cooperation that was achieved in the IPD^2 game was higher than in other
variants of the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Figure 6A shows the time course of the four
possible outcomes of the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma game that is embedded in IPD^2 for human
participants. After approximately 15 rounds, the amount of mutual cooperation (CC) starts to exceed
the amount of mutual defection (DD). The asymmetric outcomes (CD and DC) tend to have lower and
decreasing levels (they overlap in Figure 6A). The same trend has been reported in the classical
Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma [3]. This trend can be described as convergence toward mutual
cooperation (CC) and away from mutual defection (DD) and asymmetric outcomes. In
Rapoport et al. [3], however, this convergence is much slower: the amount of mutual cooperation starts
to exceed the amount of mutual defection only after approximately 100 rounds in the game.
As shown in Figure 6B, the time course of the four possible outcomes for the model simulation
follows similar trends as in the human data. However, as shown at the player level (section 5.1), the
model cooperates more than human participants. This additional cooperation is sometimes
unreciprocated by the model’s opponents (the CD outcome in Figure 6B), and other times it is
reciprocated (CC). Although the model does not precisely fit the human data, the results of the
simulation are informative. The model’s sustained cooperation, even when unreciprocated by the
model’s opponents, is effective at raising the level of mutual cooperation in the game. This strategy of
signaling willingness to cooperate even when cooperation is unreciprocated has been called “teaching
by example” [3] and “strategic teaching” [6].
We claim that IPD^2 converges toward mutual cooperation and away from mutual defection due to
the intragroup power dynamics. To test this claim we created a variant of IPD^2 in which the
intragroup power game was replaced by a dictator game. In this variant, one of the players in each
group is designated as the dictator and keeps this status throughout a game. A dictator gets all the
power and consequently makes all the decisions for the group. Thus, this variant effectively suppresses
the central feature of IPD^2 (i.e., the intragroup competition for power) while keeping everything else
identical. It would correspond to a Prisoner’s Dilemma game between two dictatorships. Although we
do not have human data for this variant, we can use the cognitive model to simulate the outcomes of
the game. As shown in Figure 6C, the level of mutual cooperation was much lower in the dictatorship
variant than in the original IPD^2 game, proving that it was indeed the intragroup competition for
power that determined convergence toward mutual cooperation and away from mutual defection
in IPD^2.
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Figuree 6. Time course off the four possible grroup-level outcomes in the Inteergroup
Prisonner’s Dilem
mma game embedded in IPD^2. A: humanns, B: modeel, and C: model
in dicttatorship.
A- Hum
man Participants

B - Model

C – Model in dicctatorship

Rapoportt et al. [3] defined a sett of four reppetition propensities inn the Repeatted Prisonerr’s Dilemma.
They are reeferred to as alpha, beta, gamm
ma, and dellta, and arre defined by Rapopo
ort et al. [33]
as follows:
Alpha reffers to playing D after DD and deenotes unwiillingness too shift awayy from mutu
ual defectioon
because unillateral shiftiing reduces payoff.
Beta refeers to playiing C after CD, or reepeating an unreciproccated call fo
for cooperattion, denotees
f
forgiveness
or teachingg by example.
Gamma refers to pllaying D affter DC, orr repeating a lucrativee defection,, denotes a tendency to
exploit the opponent.
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Delta reffers to playiing C after CC, denotees resistancee to the tem
mptation to shift away in pursuit of
thhe largest payoff.
Figure 7 shows the repetition propensitiess of humanss as comparred with thee model. With regard to
thhe human data, the relative differences between the four proopensities are consisteent with thhe
liiterature [3]]. Thus, thee relatively higher freqquencies of alpha and delta reflectt the known
n tendency of
thhe symmetrrical outcom
mes (CC annd DD) to be more stab
ble than thee asymmetrical
i ones (CD and DC
C).
The differennce betweenn Beta and Gamma refllects the ten
ndency of thhe human participants to punish thhe
non-reciproccators (loweer beta) andd exploit thee opponent (higher gam
mma). Moree interesting
g here are thhe
differences between thee model and the humaan participan
nts. The moodel is mucch more aptt than humaan
participants to shift awaay from muutual defectiion (lower alpha) (t = 7.76, p = 0.0000) and to persist in thhe
mutually coooperating outcome (higgher delta) (t = –3.99, p = 0.000). In additionn, the modell “teaches by
example” (pplays C afteer CD) moree often thann human participants (hhigher beta)) (t = –2.63
3, p = 0.0099).
The differennce in Gamm
ma is non-siignificant.
Figure 7. Repetition propensitiees in IPD^2 as defined by Rapoporrt et al. [3].
Repetition prop
pensities
0
0.9
0
0.8

Frequencies

0
0.7
0
0.6
0
0.5
0
0.4

HUMAN

0
0.3

MODEL

0
0.2
0
0.1
0
D after beta (C
( after
alpha (D
DD
D)
C
CD)

gam
mma (D
aftter DC)

delta (C after
CC)

Figure 8 shows the dynamics of reciprociity between
n the two groups playinng the IPD^^2 game. Thhe
amount of cooperation in the grouup includingg the humaan participannt (or the model) is represented on
thhe X-axis. The amounnt of cooperration in thee opposing group (com
mprised of tw
wo computer strategies)
iss represented
t on the Y-axis. Thhe horizontaal and verttical dashedd lines marrk an equaal amount of
cooperation and defection in eachh group (i.e.., proportion of cooperration = 0.55). The diag
gonal dasheed
liine is the reeciprocity liine where thhe two grouups have equ
ual proportiions of coopperation. Th
he color codde
marks the progression of a game. Red denotees the start (round 2, marked withh number 2) and purple
thhe end (rouund 50, marrked with nuumber 50) of
o the game,
e with the other colorss following
g the rainbow
w
order (the black-and-w
white printoout shows nuances off gray insteead of coloors). The first
fi round is
dropped beccause it doees not represent reciproocity (the fiirst moves of the playeers are eitheer random or
set a priori by the experrimenter). The group inncluding a human partticipant achiieves perfecct reciprocitty
with the oppposing grooup (on aveerage), i.e. they do not exhibit a bias to “teach by example” by
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sustained (uunreciprocatted) cooperaation, nor too “exploit the opponennt” by repeaated defectiion when thhe
opposing group cooperates.
r
In conntrast, the model system
matically deeparts from the recipro
ocity line (thhe
diagonal in Figure 8) inn the directiion of “teacching by ex
xample.” Thhis bias of thhe model brrings about a
higher level of cooperaation in the opposing group as weell (by abouut 10%). Nootice that th
he changes in
direction (sw
witches from
m C to D and vice verrsa) are morre radical att the beginnning of the game (abouut
10 rounds) than towardd the end of the game, when most of the gamees settle in mutual coop
peration. Thhe
model tendss to achieve mutual coooperation faster than hu
umans, and it sustains itt for a longeer time.
Figuree 8. The dynamics of reciprociity between
n the two groups in the IPD^2
2 game
averagged across all game typpes and parrticipants (h
humans or model simullations). Th
he solid
line reepresents thee human data
a and the dashed line model simuulations.

How doo humans and the moodel impactt the behav
vior of otheer players in the gam
me (computeer
strategies)? Figure 9 shhows the reesults of thhe five com
mputer strateegies when playing ag
gainst humaan
players as compared too when theey play agaainst the co
ognitive moodel. When playing ag
gainst humaan
participants,, the compuuter strategiies achieve lower leveels of payofff (Figure 9A) and low
wer levels of
cooperation (Figure 9C
C) than whenn they play against the cognitive model, likelyy due to thee lower levels
of mutual coooperation. With regardd to power, there are small and innconclusive differencess between thhe
tw
wo cases. Although humans andd the cognnitive modeel achieve comparablee levels off payoff (seee
Figure 3A), they have a differentiial impact on the otherr strategies: the humann makes theem weaker or
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thhe model makes them stronger, orr both. Thiss result sugg
gests that thhere are impportant aspects of humaan
behavior in IPD^2 that are not satisfactorily exxplained by
y the currentt version off our cognitiive model.
Figuree 9. Payofff (A), Powerr (B) and Choice (C) of the compputer strateggies when playing
againsst the humann participannt as compaared to when they playy against thee cognitive model.
The errror bars reppresent standard
n
errors of the mean
n with participants as units of anallysis.
A

B

Payyoff of comp
puter strateegies

Powerr of computter strategie
es
0.56

0.08

0.52
Power

0.1

Payoff

0.06
0.04
0.02

HUMAN

0

MODEL

0.48
0.44

HUMAN

0.4

MODEL

‐0.02
‐0.04
‐0.06

C

Proportion of cooperation

Choice of computerr strategies
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
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5.3. Variability across Game Typess and Individual Particcipants
So far, we have presented the results aggregated
d across all game typpes. Howev
ver, there is
significant variability between gam
me types with regard to human behavior annd game outtcomes. Thhis
variability reeflects the differences between thee computer strategies thhat are incluuded in each game type.
There is alsoo variabilityy across individual partticipants.
Figure 10 shows thee values of payoff (10A
A), power (1
10B), and choice (10C) for each game type foor
thhe human participantts and the corresponnding modeel simulatioons. The numbers in
n the X-axxis
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correspond to the types of game shown in Table 3. The standard errors of the mean are also plotted for
the human data to suggest the range of variation across human participants. One can see that variability
across game types greatly exceeds variability across human participants. This shows that an important
determinant of human behavior in IPD^2 is the composition of the groups in terms of the players’
strategies. The model seems to capture the relative differences between game types reasonably well,
showing a level of adaptability to opponent strategies comparable to that of human participants.
However, when looking at each game type in isolation, the model is less accurate in matching the
human data. In addition, as for the aggregate data previously presented, the model matches the human
data on payoff and power better than on choice, suggesting that there are aspects of human behavior in
this game that are not captured by this simple model. We will discuss some limitations of the model in
the following sections.
5.4. Discussion of Model Fit and Predictive Power
As mentioned in Section 3.2, our cognitive model of IPD^2 leaves the parameters of the ACT-R
architecture at their default values. However, one could ask whether changes in the values of the key
parameters would result in different predictions. We tested for this possibility and came to the
conclusion that parameters have very little influence on the model outcomes/predictions. Table 4
shows a comparison between model predictions and human data with regard to payoff across game
types (see also Figure 10A). A space of two parameters was considered, memory decay rate (d) and
activation noise (s). Three values were considered for each parameter: one is the ACT-R default value,
one is significantly lower, and another one is significantly higher than the default value. The cells
show correlations and root mean squared deviations between the model predictions and the human data
for each combination of the two parameters: these values do not significantly differ from one another.
Two factors contributed to this low sensitivity of the model to parameter variation: (1) The IPD^2 task
is different than other tasks that are used in decision making experiments and IBLT models. Since
IPD^2 is a 4-player game, the number of unique situations and sequential dependencies is rather large.
The length of a game (50 rounds) allows for very few repetitions of a given situation, thus leaving very
little room for parameters controlling memory activation and decay to have an impact on performance.
(2) The IPD^2 model learns from feedback (payoff) in an all-or-none fashion: it is not sensitive to the
real value of payoff but only to its valence (see also the diagram of the model in
Figure 1. We have attempted to build models that take the real value of payoff into account and, while
these models achieve better performance in IPD^2, they are not as good at fitting the human data as the
simple model described in this paper.
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Figuree 10. Payofff (A), Power (B), and Choice (C)) by game type. The errror bars rep
present
standaard errors off the mean with particippants as uniits of analyssis.
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Table 4. Sensitivvity of the model to varriations in parameter values. Row
ws are variattions in
decay rate (d) and columnns are variations in activation noise (s). The cells contain
correlaations and root mean squared devviations (in parenthesess) between model pred
dictions
and huuman data with regard to payoff accross game types.
d\s
0.7
0.5
0.3

0.1
0.95
(0.037)
0.93
(0.042)
0.89
(0.05)

0.2
25
0.9
95
(0.0
035)
0.9
95
(0.0
035)
0.9
94
(0.0
036)

0.4
0.94
(0.04)
0.94
(0.038)
0.95
(0.035)
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To assesss the value of a particular model one needs to
o consider alternative models. Sincce IPD^2 is a
new game, there are noo alternativve models proposed by
y independeent researchhers. We do
o expect succh
models to be available in the neear future and in the meantime are explorring alternaative modeels
ourselves. A first versioon of a sim
mple reinforccement learning
r
(RL) model lookss promising
g but it is noot
as good as the IBLT model descriibed above.. The RL model of IPD
D^2 (also im
mplemented
d in ACT-R
R)
chooses bettween two actions (C and D) im
mplemented as producttion rules based on th
heir expecteed
utilities com
mputed by the associated archiitectural mechanisms. Observed utilities (payoffs) are
propagated back to the previous actions (w
with a temp
poral discouunt) and caause adjustm
ments of thhe
expected utiilities. As shhown in Figgure 11, the RL model has a good fit to the paayoff data and a poor fit
too the powerr and choicce data. Partticularly, thhe model deefects more often than the humanss. This resuult
could be expplained by the fact thatt the RL moodel is only
y aware of itts own choiices and theeir associateed
r
rewards
andd it does nott differentiaate betweenn various sittuations in the game suuch as who the majoritty
player is in each groupp, and whaat decisionss the other players takke. We do acknowledg
ge that morre
sophisticatedd RL models might bee able to fit the data better than the current onne, and we are currentlly
exploring suuch models.
Figuree 11. Time course of Payoff (A), Power (B), and Choicee (C) for thhe RL modeels. The
error bars represeent standard errors of thhe mean witth participannts as units of analysis..
A

B
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C

6. General Discussion and Concllusion
We havee introduced IPD^2—a new gam
me paradigm
m to study the impact of intragrou
up power on
inntergroup conflict and cooperationn. We arguee that IPD^^2 offers a richer opporrtunity than
n the classical
Repeated Prrisoner’s Dilemma foor modelingg real-world
d situationss in whichh intra- and
d inter-grouup
innteractions are entanggled [7]. IP
PD^2 compplements other approaches that focus on th
he intra- annd
innter-group interactionns [8-10] byy the addittion of an intragroupp power vaariable. In the standarrd
Repeated Prrisoner’s Diilemma, thee outcome of mutual defection is self-reinforrcing althou
ugh it can be
overcome iff the game is played for long annd indefinitee periods. In IPD^2, mutual defeection causees
changes in the power structure off the two groups, thuss creating the chance to break frree from that
pattern and possibly evvolve towardd mutual coooperation. Due to its intragroup power dynaamics, IPD^^2
predicts thatt indefinitely repeatedd interactionn leads to a relativelyy high levell of mutuall cooperatioon
while mainttaining unilaateral and mutual defeection at rellatively low
wer levels. This is anallogous to thhe
political sphhere where there is competition for power. In such a setting, leadders who brring negativve
outcomes too their groupps can onlyy maintain their positio
on of powerr for a limitted time. IP
PD^2 has thhe
potential to model variious real-woorld scenarios.
r
For example, Leoopold II, a Belgian kin
ng in the latte
19th centuryy, behaved very differeently towarrd his Belgiian people than towardd the Congo
olese people.
He was an enlightenedd ruler in Beelgium becaause his hold on poweer could be undermined
d by populaar
sentiment, whereas he behaved likke a dictatorr in Congo because thee locals hadd no way of affecting his
power over them. To represent thhe case in which desp
pots can elliminate theeir opposition, we havve
r
replaced
thee intragroup power gam
me by a dictaator game.
In our sttudy, we finnd that humaan participaants cooperaate more andd the level of mutual cooperation is
higher in IPD
D^2 than inn the classiccal Repeatedd Prisoner’ss Dilemma game. This is merely a preliminarry
trrend and prediction for the hum
man-human interaction
ns for whicch we do not yet hav
ve data. Thhis
prediction is at odds with whaat is know
wn in the literature as the “innterindividuaal-intergrouup
discontinuityy” effect (IIID), which describes grroups to be less cooperrative than individuals [29]. In facct,
we predict a reversal off this effect: two groupps achieve more mutuall cooperatioon in IPD^2
2 than do tw
wo
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individuals in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Wildschut et al. [29] predicted that a reverse IID
effect was possible, although there was no study at that time to show it. We have suggestive evidence
that the reverse IID effect in IPD^2 is caused by the addition of an intragroup power variable. The two
groups cannot sustain mutual defection for long because mutual defection causes internal shifts in
power. Individuals can maintain majority positions in their groups only when they consistently bring
about positive outcomes for their groups. In other words, power instantiates an objective sense of
payoff. Groups are able to sense gain or loss based on how these outcomes impact the group’s power
structure (gain consolidates and loss undermines power). As such, intragroup power dynamics could be
seen as an institutional loss-aversion mechanism, because they prevent the groups from tolerating
negative payoffs. This result contributes to the corroboration of the conjecture that democracy reduces
the risk of wars. When we suppressed the intragroup power competition (i.e., created dictatorships) the
groups were less likely to engage in mutual cooperation (i.e., build peace) and the probability of
mutual defection (i.e., risk of war) remained high.
The pattern of cooperation in IPD^2 oscillates around the line of perfect reciprocity (Figure8). This
result corroborates what has been found in other studies regarding the human tendency to reciprocate.
The human brain is specialized at detecting and discriminating against non-reciprocators. Negative
emotions triggered by unreciprocated attempts at cooperation bias subsequent decision-making toward
defection [30]. In our study, human participants tend to stay on the line of perfect reciprocity (on
average); they do not “walk the extra mile” that would increase the overall mutual cooperation in the
game. Most likely, they fear that their attempts at cooperation will not be reciprocated. In contrast, the
ACT-R model does not capture this fear, which allows it to continue cooperating even when its
cooperation is temporarily unreciprocated. As a consequence of this sustained cooperation, the model
causes the level of mutual cooperation in the game to increase. This is also merely a prediction of our
model, because we do not yet have humans at the other end of the interaction.
We have shown that simple cognitive mechanisms can explain a range of behavioral effects in
IPD^2. These cognitive mechanisms were not designed specifically for this task. They are part of the
ACT-R architecture and have been validated in many tasks that are unrelated to game playing. The
default parameters of ACT-R that were used for the current model (and the model of Prisoner’s
dilemma that served as a starting point of the current model [2]) are used in most ACT-R models of
various effects from the psychological literature. In addition, there is already a tradition of using
ACT-R to model various game theoretic phenomena [2,23,28,31,32] including cases in which humans
play against artificial opponents [23,24,28,33].
We used the model to try to understand what humans do, and we used the human data to test the
assumptions of the model. For example, the model showed lower cooperation in minority, mimicking
the same trend in human data. The model shows this effect because it increases the activation of the
alternative option after receiving negative feedback (if C caused the negative feedback, then D is also
activated, and vice versa). This could be an explanation for why participants cooperated less when in
minority: they receive more negative feedback (see Figure 5B), and this might make them more
tempted to explore alternative actions. In this case, the model informed the human data, because it
generated a hypothesis about human behavior. An alternative hypothesis for this effect would be that
minority players perceive their likelihood of winning as low and become less constructive [34]. In turn,
the human data was used to test the model’s assumptions. For example, the human data departed
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significantly from the predictions of the model regarding the amount of cooperation: the model
predicted higher levels of cooperation than observed (Figures 4 and 6); in addition, the model shows
lower alpha (D after DD) and higher beta (C after CD) repetition propensities than the human
participants (Figure 7). These results are most likely caused by the fact that the model does not have
emotional reactivity that would bias its decision making processes. We are currently exploring ways to
improve the model’s fit to the human data by adding an emotional component to the existing cognitive
mechanisms of ACT-R. Some of the differences between the model simulations and the human data
could be caused by social and cultural factors. This hypothesis can also be tested in future studies by
varying such factors and observing the impact on power, payoff, and proportion of cooperation. If such
biases exist, they could be added to our model.
Our cognitive modeling approach could complement the traditional equilibrium analyses in
predicting the effect of game modifications. In repeated games, almost any outcome can be an
equilibrium. Game simulations with validated cognitive models as players could be used to narrow
down the set of possible equilibria to a limited number of cognitively plausible outcomes and,
subsequently, generate specific predictions about human behavior in these games.
Based on its potential to represent many realistic aspects of social interaction, IPD^2 is an
especially useful paradigm for studying human behavior in conflict situations. This paradigm
complements the standard interindividual and intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma games by adding a new
variable—intragroup power—that simultaneously represents both the ability of a player to bring about
outcomes and the impact of those outcomes on the player’s status. We have shown that cognitive
modeling can be a useful tool for understanding the processes that underlie human behavior in IPD^2.
Evidently, more research within the IPD^2 paradigm is needed, particularly to test human behavior
in interactions with other humans and to extend the model to include realistic emotional reactions to
conflict. More research is also needed to extend IPD^2 to reflect a wider range of real-world
conflict situations.
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Annex 1: The number of participants by field of study.

Field of study
Biology
Business
Chemical Engineering
Computer Science
Decision Science
Design
Economics
Education

Number of participants
4
1
2
8
1
5
2
2
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Annex 1: Cont.

Field of study
English
Finance
History
Information systems
International Relations
Languages
Marketing
Mathematics
Mechanical Engineering
Neuroscience
Nursing
Occupational Therapy
Paralegal
Philosophy
Piano performance
Political science
Psychology
Public Policy & Management
Religious Studies
Sociology
Transportation Engineering
Non answer

Number of participants
2
2
2
4
1
2
1
1
7
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
7

Games 20111, 2

51

Annexx 2: Model simulationss for 300 roounds. On av
verage, acrooss all game types (upp
per left
quadraant), the currves for payyoff and pow
wer are incrreasing and the proportion of coop
peration
(choice) settles around 0.88 (cooperatte 80% of time). Hoowever, theere are imp
portant
differeences betweeen game tyypes. For exxample, in game type 6 (upper riight quadran
nt), the
modell loses power and gainns payoff, while in gam
me types 7 and 8 (low
wer quadran
nts) the
modell loses payooff and mainntains poweer at a consstant level (see Table 3 for the strrategies
in eachh game typee).
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